A Foreign-Born Terrorist Could Cross the Southwest Border

Or how I learned to worry less and accept the small risk

The government recently arrested eight Tajiks in the United States who allegedly had ties to ISIS. They had crossed into the United States illegally before being apprehended by Border Patrol and released for a court date.

Nobody has explained what those supposed “ties” to ISIS were, but general good practice when hearing the word “ties” in terrorism investigations is to replace it with the phrase: “thin evidence of a connection to terrorism” or “evidence of a connection to terrorism is so dubious that we’d be embarrassed to share it.” Likely, the smuggler who brought them here had ties to ISIS, which is an even more tenuous connection to terrorism.

One reason we’ll never know what those alleged “ties” were is because there was no evidence of a terrorist plot, no evidence that these eight Tajiks were planning an attack, and the government has not and likely will not charge them with a terrorism offense. The Tajik migrants were arrested for immigration offenses and are currently in ICE detention, facing civil deportation proceedings. There is no evidence that they were planning a terrorist attack, according to government sources.

Since 2016, my research on foreign-born terrorism has shown that the threat is relatively minor. During the 1975-2023 period, foreign-born terrorists murdered 3,046 people on U.S. soil in attacks committed by a total of 230 terrorists, which includes attackers, those who planned attacks, or who were convicted of terrorism offenses where they plotted an attack. The annual chance of being murdered in an attack carried out by a foreign-born terrorist during that time is about 1 in 4.5 million a year. By comparison, the annual chance of being murdered by a common criminal in the United States was about 1 in 13,767. In other words, the annual chance of being murdered in an ordinary homicide was about 323 times as great as dying in an attack committed by a foreign-born terrorist on U.S. soil.

About 98 percent of the 3,046 victims of foreign-born terrorism were murdered in the 9/11 attacks. Since then, 44 people have been murdered by foreign-born terrorists on U.S. soil. None of those victims were murdered in an attack committed by a terrorist who entered as an illegal immigrant.[1]

However, nine foreign-born terrorists entered the United States as illegal immigrant terrorists during those 49 years, and they were convicted of plotting attacks they never carried out. Five terrorists illegally crossed the U.S.-Canada border, one stowed away on a ship, and three illegally crossed the U.S.-Mexico border as young children. Those three were Dritan Duka, Eljvir Duka, and Shain Duka, and they entered illegally in 1984 when they were aged 5, 3, and 1, respectively.

They were arrested in 2007 while plotting to attack Fort Dix, New Jersey. “Plotting” is perhaps too strong of a word because the Dukas were disorganized buffoons and petty criminals who didn’t even manage to graduate high school. Their “plot” was discovered when a video clerk viewed a VHS tape that the trio had asked him to convert into a DVD. The clerk alerted law enforcement when the video showed the three brothers shooting guns while shouting Jihadist slogans. 

Since the Duka brothers allowed a clerk to watch a videotape of themselves cosplaying as terrorists, the closest thing to a terrorist attack committed by an illegal immigrant is from earlier in 2024, when two Jordanian men were arrested for trespassing after attempting to drive onto a military base in Quantico, Virginia. According to a news report, the driver recently crossed the U.S.-Mexico border. The arresting officers did not find weapons, plans of an attack, motives, or statements about wanting to commit an attack. The driver stopped at the vehicle barrier, answered questions, and had a valid delivery order. They were probably just delivery men who tried to enter at the wrong gate.

A Fox News article about the Quantico trespassing case says, “The same truck, had it been loaded with explosives, could have been a devastating weapon if it made it close enough to an occupied building.” Here’s a more accurate way to write that sentence: "The same truck, had terrorists driven it, could have been a devastating weapon if it made it close enough to an occupied building." One could write that sentence about any truck or driver in the United States. Terrorists didn’t drive the truck in Quantico, nor was it filled with explosives, so it was nothing worth reporting in a sane world. The drivers are in immigration detention. If there were any evidence of a terrorist plot, then the drivers would be awaiting trial and lengthy prison sentences. All the evidence says they were delivery drivers.

Todd Bensman, a researcher at the Center for Immigration Studies, even proclaimed that the Quantico trespassing case was “the first terror attack by a border-crossing illegal alien” and  wrote, “Go ahead Biden and friends, prove me wrong.”

The police incident report proves him wrong (see image below). Proclaiming it was the first attack committed by an illegal immigrant border crosser is also a mighty admission from Bensman, who wrote a book about how illegal immigrant terrorists have crossed the border illegally. What was his first book even about then? One also wonders what evidence could be presented to prove Bensman wrong. A handwritten note by the Jordanian that says, “I am not a terrorist?”

The lack of evidence of terrorism and the police incident report should be good enough. Bensman morphed the classic government anti-terror warning “see something, say something,” into the post-modern “say something, see something.” Terrorism is so rare that hysterical writers have to make up attempted attacks because the demand for reading about attacks is greater than the supply of actual attacks.

The logic of Bensman’s statement is astounding. What evidence do we have that Bensman himself isn’t an illegal immigrant planning an attack? Oh, he says he was born here and has never been arrested or charged with such a heinous offense? That’s just what the Biden administration and the media want you to think because we all know reporters hate reporting on terrorism, prosecutors don’t want to make their careers prosecuting heinous criminals, and politicians never want to exaggerate the risks of terrorism. Go ahead Biden and friends, prove me wrong.

Bensman’s unilateral proclamation that a trespassing case was a terrorist attack is further evidence that the terrorist threat from illegal immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border is minor. However, the threat of terrorists crossing the U.S.-Mexico border and committing an attack here is above zero. Although it has not happened, that does not mean that it could not happen. The chance is slight, but it is greater than zero, and I have never said otherwise. There is a higher chance that illegal immigrant terrorists will cross and be arrested before committing their attacks, as has happened nine times before. We only know about those nine individuals because I painstakingly constructed a dataset of all the foreign-born terrorists who entered the United States since 1975 and identified the visas they had or didn’t have when they came. Of the 230 foreign-born terrorists who committed attacks on U.S. soil since 1975 or who were arrested and convicted for plotting attacks, 56 of them killed at least one innocent person in an attack (I don’t count terrorists as victims if they die in their attacks). In other words, about 76 percent of foreign-born terrorists haven’t murdered anyone in their attacks.

If an illegal immigrant terrorist does cross the border and commits an attack on U.S. soil that kills someone (God forbid), what would that mean? It would obviously be a tragedy for the victims and their families. To them, illegal immigrant terrorism would be the only hazard that matters, and the unlikeliness of such a crime occurring would not make them feel better, nor should it. They would rightly demand justice and vengeance against the terrorists, and they would be entitled to both. However, public policy can't pursue the goal of reducing the already small risk of terrorism to zero because doing so would be too expensive.

As mentioned above, the chance of being murdered in a foreign-born terrorist attack was about 1 in 4.5 million per year (1 in 4,449,257, precisely) during the 1975-2023 period. If zero people are murdered in foreign-born terror attacks on U.S. soil in 2024, the annual chance would drop to about 1 in 4,560,188 over that 50-year period (assuming a small increase in the U.S. population). If an illegal immigrant terrorist this year murders 15 people in an attack, which would make it the deadliest single attack committed by a foreign-born terrorist on U.S. soil since 9/11, the chance of being murdered in an attack would rise to 1 in 4,537,841 over those 50 years. You can decide whether the increase from 1 in 4,560,188 a year to 1 in 4,537,841 a year is a big increase.

The cost of pursuing the goal of zero deaths through foreign-born terrorism is so extraordinarily high that it would result in far more deaths. The U.S. government has spent well over a trillion dollars on domestic counterterrorism since 9/11, which doesn't include the cost of foreign wars, lost economic growth from immigration restrictions, or other costs incurred in the fight against terrorism. The value of human life is high, but it is not infinite. You don’t even value your life infinitely because you make decisions every day that increase your chance of dying prematurely. If you're incredulous at that statement, ask yourself whether you've ever voluntarily ridden in an automobile.

Over 40,000 people a year die in car accidents, with a chance of dying in a car accident of about 1 in 8,000 in 2022. If you’ve ever voluntarily ridden in an automobile and taken that chance, you don’t value your own life infinitely. You may counter, “but driving has a benefit.” Indeed, it does, and there are benefits to every activity. The challenge is identifying activities where the benefits exceed the costs, including externalities, to allow those activities to continue and to take reasonable actions that reduce the costs so long as the benefits are higher. Criminals could throw a brick through your window, but nobody thinks it would make sense to spend a billion dollars to prevent that. 

So, how much should the U.S. government spend on counterterrorism to prevent one terrorist attack that would kill 15 people (to take an extreme example)? Furthermore, what restrictions on beneficial activities like immigration should the government impose to prevent one terrorist attack that would kill 15 people? We’ve already established that the amount shouldn’t be infinite. Economists like to use the value of statistical life despite its problems and generous assumptions could bump that value up to $15 million for deaths committed by violence. Let's assume the VSL is $25 million just to be extra generous. It would be worth spending up to $375 million to stop a terrorist attack that would kill 15 people.

Let’s further assume all counterterrorism spending, immigration restrictions, and other rules that prevent mutually beneficial activities intended to reduce terrorism in the United States cost $2 trillion since the 9/11 attacks (surely an undercount). At a value of statistical life measured at $25 million and $2 trillion spent to stop terrorist attacks, that money would have to have prevented 80,000 murders during that time to break even. In reality, 44 people have been murdered by foreign-born terrorists on U.S. soil since 9/11. Either those counterterrorism actions and spending prevented at least 99.95 percent of deaths in foreign-born terrorist attacks on U.S. soil that would have happened otherwise, or the government is overspending on counterterrorism and restricting too many of our freedoms. Which do you think is more likely?

The best counterargument is that the government would likely react in an extremely costly way to a terrorist attack committed by an illegal immigrant. In other words, the political and policy reaction by the government would be so unhinged, disproportionate, and destructive that it would make sense for the government to do a lot more now to prevent such an attack from ever occurring. What could the government do in response to an attack by an illegal immigrant? Here is just a speculative sample based on experience: put troops on the border, create a large-scale domestic deportation program, pass a new PATRIOT Act-style domestic police and surveillance law, massively increase domestic spying, close the borders, and invade other countries. And those are just the obvious ones.  

Those reactions to terrorism are worth avoiding, and if preventing an attack is the only way to avoid them, then my critics have a good point. However, the implicit assumption is that more government anti-terrorism activities today would have a good chance of preventing such an attack tomorrow. The evidence that more spending, civil liberty violations, or other actions today would substantially reduce the already tiny chance of illegal immigrant terrorism is unconvincing. After all, there are few limits to what could be done to increase security, but most of the pre-attack politically acceptable enhancements would have practically zero effect on actually increasing security. More security theater is different from more security. The likely effect of enhanced security to reduce an already small risk is that we get more alarmism, expenditures, and reductions in our liberties for an immeasurably slight increase in security. In other words, we'd get the negative policy effects of a terrorist attack without suffering such an attack in exchange for a slightly smaller chance of attack. The best bet is to not overreact before or after an attack.

If an illegal immigrant terrorist does commit an attack on U.S. soil, thousands of people will jump down my throat to claim that I was wrong. Several have already done so, even though no such attack has occurred. But they misunderstand me; I do not claim that the chance is zero. There is absolutely a chance above zero that an illegal immigrant terrorist could cross the border and commit an attack here. After all, I've discussed for years the nine illegal immigrant terrorists who have crossed the border whom I've identified and cataloged. My claim is that the chance is low, that it hasn't happened yet, and that the government shouldn't change policy much or at all, depending upon the scale of the attack, if it does happen. In other words, a terrorist attack committed by an illegal immigrant doesn’t mean I was wrong all along.

Terrorist attacks are terrible tragedies and horrific crimes. None of the above should make victims or their families feel better, nor is it intended to. The U.S. government should continue to spend resources to reduce the threat of foreign-born terrorism, but probably less than they currently do.

It would be awful if an illegal immigrant entered the United States and committed an attack. Still, it would not be infinitely awful, and the government should not do everything possible to reduce the already low chance to zero. A single attack or even a series of attacks committed by illegal immigrant terrorists would not increase the hazards of terrorism enough to justify more counterterrorism spending, immigration restrictions, or other limitations on the freedoms of Americans. An illegal immigrant terrorist could cross the border and commit an attack here. But if it happens, the government should not overreact to it.

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[1] Identifying the visas used by foreign-born terrorists to enter the United States is more conceptually tricky than it first appears. Foreigners who stay in the country for long periods tend to enter on one visa, adjust their visa status to another visa, and often do so many times before they eventually leave, settle down to living on a green card or naturalizing, or become illegal immigrants. Several of the 230 foreign-born terrorists behaved similarly. I counted the visas that they initially used to enter the U.S., except for asylum seekers, whom I count under the asylum visa category. That exception is important because those individuals usually make their claim at the U.S. border or after they have entered on another visa, often to apply for asylum. Illegal immigrants who crossed the border or jumped a ship didn't enter as a visa, so they entered illegally but I refer to their mode of entry as a "visa" for simplicity's sake. There are a few reasons to count the terrorists against the visa they originally entered on. First, it's simpler because their entire immigration histories are not always available, but information on their first visa is usually available. Second, this way of counting is consistent across all the terrorists and allows for a more robust comparison. Third, counting this way can help identify the initial security failure that allowed them to enter the U.S. – if there was such a failure.